Since the early 1990s the study of films has become an important part of landscape studies. Recently, Stuart Aitken and Deborah Dixon (2006) have called geographers to make critical attempts at understanding and articulating what films and media reveal to us beyond just geographic realism, spatial metaphors, or even the production of meaning. They suggest that we articulate what they expose about materially lived experiences and social practices.
By answering part of Aitken and Dixon's callöto gain insight into material lives as revealed through a filmic landscape öI seek to destabilize prevalent notions in social and cultural geography which portray landscape as an inert or passive entity, gaining vitality, motion, or force only when serving as a medium for human representation (eg the new cultural geographers) or production (for example, historical materialism). To this end, and in contrast to more traditional approaches, the focus of this paper does not center on human or social contexts, but seeks to go beyond this humandominated perspective to the life of landscape itself. Through this process, I explore how film can express and augment a Spinozan (and Deleuzian) mode of encounter and urge us to challenge traditional beliefs and concepts of landscape, what it is and what it does, not just through reason, but firstly and more fundamentally through the richness of the imagination and affect (Deleuze, 1988; .
The Japanese animated film Ghost in the Shell (GitS: Koª kaku Kidoª tai (1998) [1995] ), directed by Mamoru Oshii and written by Kazunori Ito and Masamune Shirow's eponymous manga (graphic serial/novel) series serve as an inspiration and the focus of this work and help inform its ideas and trajectory. In addition, the second GitS film, Innocence (Inosensu: Koª kaku Kidoª tai 2004), also inspired by Shirow's manga and written and directed by Oshii, serves as an aid in the elaboration and elucidation of its themes.
A philosophy of thought and extensioǹ`T
here is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept. '' Spinoza (Ethics, V, proposition 4) According to Spinoza, (1) there is but one substanceöGod or Nature (Deus sive Natura)ö and they are the same thing (Ethics IV, proposition 4 and dem.). In Spinoza's ontology or does not refer to a Cartesian alternative of other as distinct or to a Hegelian other as antithesis, but to or as and simply understood from a different perspective. As part of this single substance of God or Nature humans can perceive two of an infinite array of attributesöthought and extension. To the realm of thought we understand ideas and by extension bodies in space. As two distinct attributes, thought and extension cannot be cause or effect of one another:``a body is not limited by thought nor a thought by a body'' (Ethics, I, def. 2; see also Ethics, III, proposition 2 and dem.). Instead, both exist concomitantly as two perspectives of the same phenomenon or event (Ethics, III, proposition 2, scholia). As Steven Smith (2003, page 70 ; see also Deleuze, 1988, page 18) explains,`[ Spinoza's view, which some theorists have come to call] [p]arallelism [,] implies that mind and body are not two things but one considered only from different points of view.
Changes in one do not effect changes in the other; they are changes in the other.'' He continues,``We can be viewed as bodies existing in space and time or as minds expressing purposes and desires, but both are aspects of the same human identity... .They form parts, albeit heterogeneous parts, of a comprehensive science of human nature. '' As individuated modes among infinite modes, or``real beings [which are comprised of a single substance and] which have an essence and existence of their own, but do not exist and have no being apart from the attributes in which they are produced'' (Deleuze, 1988, page 91) , humans and landscape necessarily affect and are affected by one another in a nonhierarchical extensional relationship of forces and flows. As Peter Nidditch (1964, page 191) simply puts it,``For Spinoza, each object in the world ... is affiliated to others and both affects and is affected by the characteristics of others.'' A question of landscape and human relational connections to it then begins not as a Cartesian or Hegelian or, but as and; it is not landscape as ideas (for example, representations, texts, and symbols) or landscape as material, but landscape as ideas and material. This is to say that landscape understood from a human perspective is at one and the same time material and ideas; or what Spinoza calls extension and thought öeach an embedded attribute of the same substance experienced and informed through the body as affect (see Thrift, 2004, page 60) .
Despite the fact that landscape holds an inherent relational connection with human bodies expressed in and through thought (ideas) and extension (material)öand that landscape has served as a focus of study for several decades örarely has the vitality and life of landscape itself been considered, let alone approached, in social and cultural geography. This is where the medium of film, coupled with a decentered and nonhierarchical Spinozan approach to landscape, aids in an analysis seeking insight beyond conventional thought and practice:``The task of cinema is to create but also to decreate, to decreate what exists to create something new'' (Noys, 2004) .
The living landscape of film`A ll data that exists is both reality and fantasy. Whichever it is, the data a person collects in a lifetime is a tiny bit compared to the whole. '' Batou (GitS 1998 [1995 Aitken and Dixon state that the medium of film and its (re)presentations of space, landscape, scale, and mobility make it an attractive and appropriate channel for geographic analysis (2006; see also Aitken, 1991) . Jeff Hopkins (1994, page 47) relates that cinematic landscape``has its own geography, one that situates the spectator in a cinematic place where space and time are compressed and expanded and where social ideals, mores, values, and roles may be sustained or subverted. '' Matthew Farish (2005, page 114 ) similarly affirms the potential subversive nature of filmic landscapes when he asserts that cinema``can contain potential challenges to conventional representations of ... cities and their people'' (emphasis in original). Further, as Farish's statement suggests, filmic landscapes themselves may be understood not just as passive backdrops or foregrounds of human activity, whether within a film or between the film and viewer, but as`actors' or`workers' in their own right (Aitken, 1991; Aitken and Dixon, 2006; Ford, 1994; Hopkins, 1994; Kennedy, 1994) .
The ability of film to`create something new' is often enhanced through the science fiction genre and its spatial projections (see Smith, 2002, page xi) , which can be understood in geographical terms as a sometimes fantastical and oftentimes poignant hyperpresentation of Don Mitchell's analysis of landscape as both a work and doing work (Mitchell, 1996 ; see Aitken and Dixon, 2006) . Indeed, the ability of science fiction to create new environments and evoke senses of wonder (Smith, 2002 , page xi) is so potent that it has even warranted a collection of work (Kitchin and Kneale, 2002) discussing its impacts on such topics as the geographical imagination, geopolitics, identity, power, and modernity.
The medium of animation and the ways in which it expresses the performative abilities of filmic landscapes can also play a vital role in promoting cognitive estrangement (Hopkins, 1994; Wood, 2006) .``The cartoon city is an iconic sign because it is recognizable as a city; it resembles a skyline, albeit a photographic image of a handdrawn representation of a city's skyline. There remains a causal connection to the real world, but the indexical relationship is less direct'' (Hopkins, 1994, page 54) . Unless the goal is a na|« ve realist representation of landscapes or cityscapes, this less direct indexical relationship is in fact beneficial, especially in respect to GitS. The spectator is placed in a position where``distortions in what one might visually experience, or expect to experience, as a city in the everyday material world'' is more readily accepted (page 54). In this way, animation permits a step beyond traditional limited worldviews, to a place where the imagination may consider and in fact experience alternative realities. Here, Antonio Negri's reading of the imagination in Spinozan thought proves insightful.
According to a more traditionalist reading of Spinoza's work, the imagination appears to be something merely to work against or rise above: a type of knowledge which brings us farther away from knowing ourselves and the world around us. However, as Genevieve Lloyd (1996, page 63) explains, Negri contrasts this reading by understanding the imagination in Spinoza's thought not merely as a disruptive force, but as a constitutive one whose``constructions now become a proper object of rational understanding.'' Thus, the``[i]magination becomes something more than a source of error, to be transcended ... [instead] [t]he goal is ... to complement it and collaborate with it'' through reason. Michael Hardt (2002, page 102) , extrapolating Deleuze's exposition of Spinoza, understands a similar quality and constitutive role of the imagination, which``we must use as our point of departure'' in any practical epistemological project. As Hardt makes clear, imaginationö which belongs to Spinoza's first kind of knowledge ö and its basis in corporeality, may be a source of falsity, but``is nonetheless composed of ideas that may be true'' (page 102, emphasis in original). This is not to say that imagination is the same as the two more advanced kinds of knowledge Spinoza puts forward ö reason and intuition (Ethics, II, proposition 40, scholia 2), which are, according to Spinoza,``necessarily true'' (Ethics, II, proposition 41, italics in original)ö but that these kinds of knowledge are inextricably tied in some way to the imagination. (2) By communicating its important ideas collectively through film, animated visuals, imagery, and the science fiction genre, GitS allows us by way of the imagination to better consider and understand the very material conditions the acting landscape presents.``Thought-as-imagination'', as Brian Massumi (1992, page 101) explains in an elaboration of Deleuzian^Guattarian theory,``departs from the actual, dips into the fractal abyss, then actualizes something new.'' An examination of the back-ground(ed) ideas and philosophies of Shirow's GitS and their relation to Spinozan/Deleuzian thought will be helpful in explaining how`thought-as-imagination' can be led to an understanding that landscape, in its own difference, lives.
(2) These readings are strengthened by the fact that Spinoza's philosophy itself can be seen as largely influenced by and inseparable from Jewish tradition and imagination (see Lloyd, 1996 , pages 4^5; Ravven and Goodman, 2002; Wolfson, 1969 (Koestler, 1967, page 49 ) is problematic. To step beyond this habitual way of thinking, Koestler introduces the concept of the holon, taken from the Greek word for whole (holos) and the suffix for part or unit (-on). In a most basic sense, a holon is both a part and a whole, a part made up of multiple holons functioning within a hierarchical structure of a whole, which itself is another, grander holon. According to Koestler,`O rganisms and societies are multi-leveled hierarchies of semi-autonomous sub-wholes branching into sub-wholes of a lower order, and so on. The term`holon' has been introduced to refer to these intermediary entities which, relative to their subordinates in the hierarchy, function as self-contained wholes; relative to their superordinates as dependent parts. This dichotomy of`wholeness' and`partness', of autonomy and dependence, is inherent in the concept of hierarchic order, and is called here thè Janus principle' '' (page 58). Though Koestler attempts to abstractly describe the holon hierarchies as`functional' in relation to their temporal processes, and`structural' in relation to their spatial aspects, Shirow questions the very ability to define an actual existing holon (2004, author's note, page 343). Rather interestingly, especially from a poststructuralist [or what David Hoy (2004) terms`postcritique'] perspective, while Shirow clearly accepts the interconnection and interrelation of part-wholes and whole-partsöand Koestler's agenda which dismisses Cartesian dualisms öhe moves beyond the simple mechanistic hierarchically situated structures of Koestler when he writes,`T he spirit world is infinite in its range, but from our perspective it includes everything from just below human ö from residual memories to simple insect and animal spiritsö to way above human (macrocosmic spirits at the limits of human imagination). Like human inner space, the spirit world is not vertically ordered in a hierarchy of control. Instead, the upper level is the sum of the activities of multiple sections. The same principle also applies, I suspect, to politics and ecosystems. Of course, if you select specific, individual levels to examine independently, then the entire structure appears to have a master-slave/topdown control aspect to it, but one suspects that the act of selection itself is what yields the materialistic conclusions to which people often come '' (2004, author's note, page 243 (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005; Massumi, 1992 , pages 70^71) ö that is, an assembling body with no underlying organizational principles. Additionally, Shirow states,``If we're talking about infinite free holons in both lower and upper levels, then inner space and outer space continue ad infinitum. Shinto also considers things in terms of three stagesö the ikumusubi or conscious self, the tarumusubi or unconscious self, and the tamazumembushi or the self that transcends self '' (2004, author's note, page 273). What Shirow brings here is a perspective of relational complexity shaded with Shinto ways of knowing and understanding.
I understand that at this point it may initially strike some readers as odd that I choose to juxtapose Spinoza's work with Shirow's, as the latter is deeply ingrained in Shinto thought, and part of Spinoza's Enlightenment project was an attempt to counter superstitious beliefs. However, by taking Shirow's understanding and application of Shinto as demonstrated through GitS, I show how the Shinto imagination can contribute to and augment an understanding of landscape as an entity alive and spirited, not through superstition but through reason and intuition (Spinoza's two more advanced forms of knowledge). By decentering thought from a human-dominated perspective I seek to get back to Spinoza's recognition that``the perfection of things is to be judged from their own nature rather than ours'' (Lloyd, 1996, page 48) .
According to Shirow,``all things in nature have`ghosts' '' (2004, author's note, page 37) or spirits but, because of their differences in complexity and function in respect to our everyday`logical' ways of knowing and perceiving,``and [because of] the physical constraints they have when they appear as physical phenomenon, it may be impossible to scientifically prove this''. From this perspective scientific validity may not be as important as some may think because even``Japanese rocket scientists see no opposition between their physics and computations, and the spirits of powerful deities (kami) that animate daily life, influence physical phenomenon, and enhance creativity'' (Nelson, 2000, page 2) . Above and beyond this point, as has been observed over the years (for example, see Mair, 1986) , there is no deep inherent contradiction in this ontological perspective seeing that`scientific facts' too are no less entangled (with)in or grown out of subjective views of assumption, faith, or belief.
Patrick Drazen, in his book Anime Explosion (2003), recognizes the importance of Shinto thought in GitS, particularly in respect to the most readily decipherable themes which run through the questions of the film's key protagonist, the female cyborg Major Motoko Kusanagi: What composes identity? What does it mean to be human? What is the essence of life? Drazen argues that``[a]ncient Japan offered answers to all ... [these questions] in the animistic beliefötransferred to Shintoöthat spirits abound in the world, and aren't limited to living things. A mountain may have a spirit, or a piece of wood carved into an arch, or even a locomotive' ' (2003, page 340) . Though Drazen states that spirits``aren't limited to living things'', he is using a particular traditional and limited definition of life.
For Shirow, a definition of what exactly`life' is would be difficult to achieve as it is`s uch an unscientific word '' (2004, author's note, page 343) . Following the discussed influences on Shirow's work, however, I can see that a traditional biological definition of life will not do as (1) everything is a part of the whole and as such is inseparable from what is traditionally deemed biological or organic life and because of (2) the Shinto perspective that spiritöa fundamental aspect related to power, striving, affect, (3) In fact, Deleuze (2005) and Lloyd (1994, page 10) (among others) explain Spinoza's concept of bodies in the very terms of composites and parts and wholes. expression, and, thus, life öcan and does belong to all and every holon, part, subwhole, mode, or whatever linguistic designation one chooses. This point is underscored by James Boyd and Tetsuya Nishimura in their analysis of renowned Japanese director Hayao Miyzaki's anime film Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi 2001) and its`indebtedness' to Shinto thought:`S hrine Shinto understands the whole of life, including both humans and nature, as creative and life giving. A generative, immanent force (musubi; ki; kami^nature) harmoniously pervades the whole phenomenal world. This creative process is a continual, ongoing one, and is neither arbitrary nor deterministic. Unusual or`superior' manifestations of this generative, vital power, called kami, can be experienced as possessing an awesome presence and potency. All phenomena are candidates for this designation, e.g., the sun, moon, mountains, rivers, fields, seas, rain, wind, plants and animals, or great persons, heroes or leaders '' (2004, emphasis in original) . In this way, GitS and its Shinto ways of knowing collapse dualistic distinctions and separations of life and nonlife, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic, recognizing a vibrant and vital immanent force in all phenomena. In effect, these Shinto perspectives closely parallel Spinoza's portrayal of the extensional interrelationship of nature and life (Nash, 1989, pages 20, 146; see de Jonge, 2004) and the conatus öor the continual desiring, endeavoring or striving``to preserve in one's being'' (Smith, 2003, page 95 )öof all finite things.
Masatsugu Maruyama (2000, pages 41^42) notes in his discussion and comparison of``deconstructive ecofeminism'' and Shinto:``in Shinto everything including nature can be seen as related, with a common origin. Humans are perceived firstly as relational beings öa member of a family and a community, which includes the land, clan and nation.'' Like Spinoza, Shinto thought understands humans and the earth as relational modes with a`common origin'; a common origin not unlike the single substance of God or Nature. (4) Shirow's work then, like that of Spinoza, Deleuze, and ecofeminism, is not vested merely in conventional scientific pursuits and their inherent limits. Instead, it is imbued with a Shinto ethic which implies and grants the possibility and plausibility that lifeö here loosely circumscribed as those things containing a spirited`ghost' or`soul' [Shirow distinguishes between the two by their level of complexity (2004, author's note, page 273)] ö exists in many forms, in any mode, at any time, and in any space or place within different degrees of complexity. An exploration of the narrative(s), themes, and ideas expressed in GitS and its portrayal of a landscape imbued with vibrancy and vitality will assist in demonstrating how reason, following the imagination, can be led to an understanding of the ghost in the city as the ghost of the city and an understanding of acting landscape as an expression of life.
(4) It is important to note that these relational and extensional affiliations are not simply material ones. To portray Spinoza's philosophy as merely`materialism' would be an error. Lloyd articulates this well:`I t is true that he [Spinoza] claims that anything extended or thinking must be either an attribute of God or a modification of God under one of his attributes. There is, after all, nothing else for it to be ... . But this does not mean that Spinoza thinks that God and the [material] world are identical. To claim that would be to leave out of account the infinity of other attributes under which God is expressed. It would also be to overlook that even God-under-the-attribute-of-extension cannot be identified strictly with the material world'' (1996, page 38). In other words, to reduce either Spinoza's philosophy or Shinto to materialism would be to ignore the human understood attribute of ideas and the infinite attributes of God or Nature in Spinoza's thought as well as the concept of spirit in Shinto. I believe this why Boyd and Nishimura (2004) speak not of the generative and immanent force of a physical or material world, but of à phenomenal' one.
Ghost in the city: a reflection of differencè`N o matter how far a jackass travels, it won't come back as a horse.'' Batou (GitS 2: Innocence 2004)
GitS takes place in a not-too-distant future where government espionage and corruption abound within a world connected through a``vast corporate network'' of information. Within this networked world, Section 9, a covert government group which specializes in the combating of technological crime, is on the hunt for the``ghost hacking'' (mind/body controlling) cyber-criminal, the``Puppet Master''. The overarching narrative of GitS centers on Section 9's Major Kusanagi and her existential angst. As a cyborg, and thus more human-made machine than biological organic human, Kusanagi ponders what her life means, what life is in general, what it means to progress, and who has ownership and control over her life and the memories on which her identity depends: herself or Section 9. As Carl Silvio (1999) relates,``Because Section Nine actually owns the material underpinnings of her subjectivity, her sense of personhood cannot be thought of apart from its bureaucratic organizational structure. Major's body thus does not exist as an ontologically stable presence that guarantees her identity, but as an ensemble of parts that circulate within a larger system.'' The narrative reveals that the Puppet Master, also known as``Project 2051'', originated as a computer program created by the government Section 9 serves. It has gained such a level of complexity that it has become a self-conscious entity (comprehending a specific attribute of thought) recognizing its own existence as one of`life' ö``My code name is Project 2501. I am a life-form that was born in the sea of information.'' Shirow explains,``In our story, the`self ' that the Puppeteer refers to is an integration of information that has reached a specific level of complexity, shifted, and created a phase called`life' '' (2004, author's note, page 271). And it is just this theme of life extended beyond its common limited and separatist applications and visually embedded in the animated filmscape which permit me to begin to understand the landscape as a relational living and endeavoring thing.
The film's landscape, and more precisely its cityscape (the difference being the varying speeds, movements, and zones of intensity between modes), is a conceptually mobile one, transferring from the manga's``Newport City'' located in the fictional`S hinhama Prefecture'' of Japan to an unnamed Newport City whose built environment is much more similar to a futuristic neo-Hong Kong. According to the film's art designer Takeuchi Atsushi,`G host in the Shell does not have a definite chosen set, but in terms of street scenes and general atmosphere, it is obvious that Hong Kong is the model. Such a choice has, of course, something to do with the theme: on the streets there flows an excess or a flood of information, along with everything this excess brings out'' (cited in Yuen, 2000) . Won Kin Yuen (2000) adds,``Water imagery is used in Ghost in the Shell as a symbol for the flood or sea of data, its massive communication system in a new urban topography, with its complex electronically-controlled switchboard and fluorescent 3-D scanner images of road maps or grids.'' Through this use of landscape as actor, the grand ideas of the movie as spoken and communicated by characters (both through body and words) are mirrored throughout GitS cityscape; all of the ruminating, musing, yearning, and seeking I sense in Major Kusanagi equally applies and can be found in the acting city.
This confluence of dialogue, theme, and imagery is most pronounced in the film's final scene when Kusanagi walks to a ledge overlooking the city and asks herself, ``And where shall I go now? The net is vast and limitless.'' (5) The immediate subsequent panning of the camera across the cityscape reveals to me that so too is the city. The capacities and capabilities of the net, the city, and their boundaries, each a`becoming-body' in the Spinozan^Deleuzian sense (Deleuze, 1988, page 127) , are, like human bodies, unknown (Ethics, III, proposition 2, scholia; see also Hardt, 2002, page 93) . Shortly before this final scene, the openness of bodily (and mental) boundaries and their becoming relational transformations are expressed when Kusanagi and the Puppet Master integrate and combineögaining from one another the advantages of further (different) information and complexity. Their corporeal bodies are largely destroyed and all that remains is Kusanagi's`brain shell'. It is in this moment, in a figuration of death and (re)birth, that the continual attaining and becoming of life are revealed. Susan Napier understands the narrative process of the film leading up to and including this scene as``initially focusing on the metaphoric potential of the body, [but which] ultimately end[s] up privileging the absence of the corporeal self to move into a transcendental, noncorporeal state of being'' (2005, page 37). I strongly disagree with Napier's analysis in two ways: first, insofar that it reflects the very Cartesian dualisms which GitS argues against; and, second, in that this central argument plays out in the film when Batou must recover Kusanagi's brain shell, her very physical self, in order for her to persevere in extension and thought.
It is not a matter of corporeal versus noncorporeal, but an understanding of body (and mind) as open and changingö as a being becoming-other (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005; Massumi, 1992 , pages 96^108) in a relational association capable of difference; it is not an escape from nor a transcendence of the physical, but a challenge to the very boundaries of substance dualisms. As Brian Ruh explains,``Kusanagi is able to find release, not by overcoming the confines of the body, but rather through the further blurring of the mind/body and organic/artificial dichotomies'' (2004, page 131). There is still a body, not static and fixed, but a body extensional continually assembling, striving, transforming, and attaining; it is in its own way a body without organs. Ironically, I believe Napier's argument that GitS offers a vision of reconciliation between technology and spirit (2005, page 114) effectively suggests as much.
After rescuing the intact brain shell, Batou embodies the new, evolved Kusanagi in the shell of a young cyborg girl acquired on the black market. It is interesting to note that in the manga Batou unwittingly secures a male body into which Kusanagi is subsequently reembodied. Ruh finds this divergence from the original story important. He relates that in traditional Japanese Buddhism a female could not attain Buddhahood until she first transformed into a man ötermed henjonanshi (2004, page 136). By subverting this notion through Kusanagi's metamorphosis and corporeal reembodiment in a female shell, the film celebrates the equal validity of the feminine. Indeed, it is this very expression of validityöthe validity of differenceöwhich further allows the philosophies and ideas of the film to seep into my imagination as meanings lived by and embodied through the city and landscape. Within GitS, memory plays a vital role in forging and encapsulating an identity and meaning of self and life. In a pivotal sequence of the film, Kusanagi reveals part of her anxiety to her partner, the cyborg Batou, following a deep ocean dive. While the cityscape and its grand edifices in the background slowly zoom in from behind, Kusanagi remains in the foreground at a constant distance, expressing to the observer who wishes to hear that her troubled contemplations also belong to the city:``J ust as there are many parts needed to make a human a human, there's a remarkable number of things needed to make an individual what they are. A face to distinguish yourself from others. A voice you aren't aware of yourself. The hands you see when you awaken. The memories of childhood, the feelings of the future. That's not all. There's the expanse of the data-net my cyber brain can access. All of that goes into making me what I am, giving rise to a consciousness that I call me.' And simultaneously confining`me' within set limits. '' Embedded in this voiced angst is an important link between childhood memoriesöan understanding of a pastöand simultaneous feelings of possible futures. This suggests that without memory or memories the future is no longer something to be understood or even considered; without memories, any sense of becoming becomes destabilized and the body is rendered instantaneously reactionary to an empirical perpetual coming which overwhelms conceptions of identity or purpose beyond the immediate momentary and fleeting concept of self. In a paradoxical relationship, a striving for control of and over inner space is forsaken by a fragmented external search reliant on experiential moments as if each is the first; connections and relations are thus conceptually abandoned. Inward extension, or what Shirow describes as inward space extending ad infinitum, is alienated as imagination is truncated by an understanding only of immediacy. Relational states of active knowing and understanding give way to disjointed fragmentations and dynamic becoming ceases. There is no more identity as part of a whole; there is no more recognition of connection to the world as extension, inside and out. There is no more reflection or recollection, only reaction. As Aitken notes in his analysis of Memento (forthcoming), the inability of that film's protagonist to forge and retain new memories makes him inordinately dependent on the empirical and observable; he becomes the embodied model of positivism taken to its ultimate logical end. Without memory everything is doubted and therefore may be denied öCartesian separations then grip identity, except in this condition there is no time and space for meditation or belief in a benevolent God to grant certainty to being and thinking. Identity thus becomes a fleeting unknown, and active becoming is overwhelmed by the disconnected singularity of itself reacting to each moment as if it is both the first and last.
In this attention to memory, GitS reasons that human remembering is not the only kind with a vital and self-reflexive existence; to hold this position is to deny difference its own valid quality of active being and becoming. This point is raised by the Puppet Master when it takes exception to the accusation that it is merely a``self-preserving program'': ``By that argument, I submit the DNA you carry is nothing more than a self-preserving program itself. Life is like a node which is born within the flow of information. As a species of life that carries DNA as its memory system man gains his individuality from the memory he carries, while memories may as well be the same as fantasy it is by these memories that man exists. When computers made it possible to externalize memory you should have considered all the implications that held.'' Oshii explicitly reveals in GitS: Innocence (2004) that computers are not the only form of external memory: so too is the city.
In a search for answers as to why gynoids (robots designed to look like human females) are killing their owners, Batou and his new partner, Togusa, travel to an industrialized city in the``Northern Frontier''. This territory, once the planned information center and symbol for the Far East's economic prosperity, has become a lawless zone dominated by criminals and multinational organizations. Gazing upon the dubious city and its ascending towers from an aircraft above, Batou briefly recounts its history to Togusa, and then observes:`R eminds me of the line`what the body creates, is as much an expression of DNA as the body itself.'... If the essence of life is information carried in DNA, then society and civilization are just colossal memory systems and a metropolis like this one, simply is a sprawling external memory.'' Much like the Puppet Master, born from a complex sea of information, the city as an external memory is also a form of complexity; and like the Puppet Master the city too exists autonomously from human memories. Despite the common belief that the city is merely a sum and totality of human constructs, the city, like the Puppet Master, strives and endeavors in its own way with a certain level of active autonomy and vitality. As it is autonomous from humans in its own complexity and with its own phenomenal realities öit exists with its own spirit. This cannot be directly sensed or experienced through direct observation, not because it is less potent or real than our own spirited vitality but because it is different. Just as the cells that function, (re)build, and help make up human bodies are unaware (or at least are differently aware) of our own ghosts, humans too are often unaware of the ghost of the city. By understanding the city as a sprawling external memory, Oshii, using Spinozan language, has recognized that knowable attributes and agreement between bodies exist beyond just thought and extension. To this end, in distinction to Spinoza, he recognizes the ability of humans to know a third type of attribute: ghost or spirit (kami). (6) Immediately following Kusanagi's expression of anxiety to Batou, he angrily demands,``Is that why you dive into a sea with a body that only sinks!? What is it you see in the water's darkness?'' A mysterious female voice responds,``For now we see through a glass, darkly.'' (7) Batou momentarily pauses, and then uncertainly asks,`T hat was you, wasn't it?'' Kusanagi rises and stares off into the distance. As bells of contemplation sound, I see the back of Kusanagi's neck and the embedded ports which allow her to connect to the cyber-net, signifying her connection and relation to the information-scape of the networked world. A quick close-up shot of her neck is followed by a sudden turn, her face framed as she stares off into the direction of (6) Though these notions may evoke in some an idea of the genius loci, I find this concept unhelpful as it has become so dominated by political interests and disparate meanings (Loukaki, 1997) . Any application of it here would prove more awkward and troublesome than helpful or insightful. (7) The words of the voice (and ones that follow) are taken from the New Testament, 1 Corinthians 13:11, 13:12, and are later reprised following Kusanagi's merging with the Puppet Master. By adopting and reconfiguring the meanings of a Christian text, GitS confronts the arbitrary separation of hemispheres and challenges the hegemony of the`West' over a belief system birthed in Asia on (and through) its own terms. distant soaring buildings at the core of the city. This close-up of the Major's face (as well as others throughout the film) can be understood in the Deleuzian sense as one enveloping its own space and time, allowing affect to create a``space for itself '' (Deleuze, 2003, page 108 ; see also Aitken and Dixon, 2006) . It is within this space of affect that landscape and cyborg deterritorialize, flowing into one another in an expression of a single voice.
Every face, Deleuze and Guattari say, contains a landscape; every landscape contains a face (2005, page 172). Like faces, landscapes are not``basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations'' (page 168). It is this very delimitation of`appropriate significations' that GitS challenges which, as an affected viewer, challenges me. The face-landscape here is not human, but cyborg ö a life-form challenging the very conception of life. The landscape-face, too, is not human, but landscape itself offering that same challenge. In the affectual space created by this face-landscape and the``relations between cuttings and flowings'' of the``collective montage'' (Deleuze, 2003, page 108) to follow, different movements and motions are brought together ö Kusanagi, the landscape, the viewer ö into an assembling and constituting affect whereby the mind begins to no longer simply consider the landscape as alive through the imagination, but finds itself moved along a becoming journey to Spinoza's more advanced type of knowledge: reason.
Leading into the collective montage is a saturated white screen space. From its fading I am immediately transported to a slow-motion scene of an airplane swooping over the city, its reflection then married briefly in passing motion over glass windows of one of the metropolis's many built extremities. The airplane and its reflection express that just as Kusanagi is a part of a whole as an entity attached to a network of information ö``conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension'' (Spinoza, Ethics, III, proposition 2, scholia) ö the city and its global networks of relation and mobility hold a similar existence. Through various shots of the cityscape and people-scape and the hypnotic rhythms of Kenji Kawai's score, I find Kusanagi wandering in wonder through the city's waterways upon a boat while images of association (extension) and reflection (thought) abound. Along the journey, the city's standing pillars of culture are darkly reflected against civilization's discarded objects and material memories in murky brown water. Subtle reflections of buildings can be vaguely detected in tower windows across that way.
Kusanagi soon spots a corporeal embodiment of her angst öa cyborg doppelga« ngeröand her wonder turns to heightened anxiety, all expressed by her troubled emotion-filled face. It is more than coincidental that the glass window separating the unnamed cyborg from the outside reflects, darkly, the surrounding built environment ö expressing that the shared stare, and the questions it holds, is mediated by and inseparable from the city itself. The camera then immediately cuts from the face of Kusanagi to the acting cityscape and a large building enveloped in scaffolding undergoing the continual process of growth and changeösignaling Kusanagi's eventual evolution by its own becoming.
As I am transported away from Kusanagi's journey (and another affective space created by her face), seemingly nondescript parts of the city presented in various angles and shades greet me, heightening understanding of the affect of the cityscape. All are alive in their own wayöa car-traveled highway, a rain-soaked street serenely walked by city-dwellers returning from (going to?) work (home?), a poster-covered facade, school children running in line to escape the rain, clad with matching yellow umbrellas, a bus reflecting the neon lights adorning the cityscape through its windshield glass while abruptly yielding to an oncoming car ... These outwardly mundane parts of the city together express parts of the cityscape's complex whole. The city, and its component streets, parks, homes, buildings, trees, rocks, etc, in its intertwined complexity, like a Spinozan body (Deleuze, 1988, page 123; Smith, 2003, page 149) , is a plurality of drives, speeds, sensations, and instincts alive with parts interacting, clashing, and coalescing. It is imbued with spirit, not of a human quality but different: not greater or lesser, bigger or smaller, but of a quality which allows me to gain a hint of insight from my own understandings and conceptions of being and becoming, striving and endeavoring. This is further signaled by a falling rain which embarks on its descent halfway through the montage, expressing a Deleuzian``assemblage of`becoming' '' (Kennedy, 2000, page 134 ) of the permeable boundaries of the bodies in the film and between the bodies of the film and myself as I am pushed, through affect, to understand the material world around me in a different way, with a different sense and feeling. It is the imagination returning, the``refrain'' of the imagination that is reason (Hardt, 2002, page 103) .
The rain as an assemblage of becoming is the messenger of connectivity and relation, the songbird of awakening to the life and affect of the built landscape. Deleuze explains,`A nd neither is the rain the concept of rain nor the state of a rainy time and place. It is a set of singularities which presents the rain as it is in itself, pure power or quality which combines without abstraction all possible rains and makes up the corresponding any-space-whatever. It is rain affect '' (2003, page 111 ). An understanding of the interconnection of this rain with all rainötiny singularities to the whole through affectödraws attention to the inclusion of this rain not only as it is in itself, but also as a connection and cycle inextricable from its becoming origins and destinations, from the sky to the landscape. It is an expression of the continual deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the rain with the clouds above and the earth below, a processual cycle of life, relation, and connection where no one part is more important to the whole than another. The sky and the landscape thus can also be understood in their own singularities which combine all possible skys and all possible landscapes through the medium of all possible rains together as a whole in a particular affect.
From the constituent images of the city, the montage scene extends to a juxtaposition of headless mannequins and the rain outside, expressing to me that both the city and the mannequins, which are often understood as spiritless and lifeless, in their own complexity and autonomy, exude their own being-becoming and spirit. In birdlike mobility, the collective montage transports my gaze from a networked city to Kusanagi, her doppelganger, and their heightened existential angst, to variously angled and seemingly random shots of a mundane cityscape, ultimately resting with a close-up shot of headless mannequins symbolizing the plight of the cyborgö and signaling that all that is created, destroyed, subsumed, and commodified is, in fact, life. From these multiplex mise-en-sce© nes the trajectory of the narrative and the condition of its protagonist are indelibly linked to those of the built landscapeö often reflected or seen through glass, darkly.
Oshii's use of landscape as a thematic device can be understood as a type of mobility through scale. The ontological questions which hound and confuse the protagonist during the film are symbolically painted throughout the cityscape, which allows it to become an actor, a work, and a visual worker of the underlying themes. By employing this technique, Oshii is able to present the built landscape as more than just an actor mimicking or reflecting affects of human feeling. Rather, by mediating the film's underlying philosophies through a cyborg protagonist öa character I can readily identify with because of her familiar form and qualitiesöand visually pushing her emotion and affect onto the landscape, Oshii allows me to understand and know the landscape, the cityscape, as an actor with an overall spirit, a kamiöand thus as an actor alive with(in) its own life. The use of animation as the vehicle of presentation plays an equally vital role in this.
While the surface narrative unfolds in linearity, the city's tale manifests as a nonlinear narrative revealed through repetitive viewings creating context and intertextuality with(in) and of itself. By understanding animation as sequenced graphic images, John Pickles's caution in respect to map analysis similarly applies:``The failure to see graphic images as part of a series of wider texts and contexts often weakens the analysis ... and results in a failure to see the full power of the image' ' (1992, page 208) . It is this full power of animated images connected to wider texts and contexts both within and beyond their filmic state(s) that permits me to understand the voice, and thus the life, of the built landscape, first through the imagination, then through reasonöand ultimately by intuition.
The landscape serves as its own expression that it is more than a passive symbol or text for human consumption, production, direction, manipulation, definition, or analyses. It is also an actor and director with its own active force, striving, and power. In a true Deleuzian flow, by way of the power of these images experienced through repetitionöthat is, repeated molecular experiences with the filmöthe difference and interconnection of a landscape of life ultimately reveals itself as it is in itself: a being and becoming that is painted and painting, affected and affecting, puppeted and puppeteering, with its own differential forces, speeds, and intensities. Indeed, if becoming is understood in a Deleuzian sense as a material molecular process of desire that cannot be explained as purely biological or natural (Kennedy, 2000, page 88 ) then landscape has as much right in its difference to every desire and becoming as do humans. In fact, as a body without organs, the landscape is``necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity'' with its own``connection of desires, conjunction of flows, [and] continuum of intensities'' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005, page 161) . Aitken (2002, page 120) has observed that in over seventy years of filmmaking`l ittle has changed in representations of SF [science fiction] cities.'' That said, understandings of what these landscapes are and do have changed (see Aitken, 2006; Thrift, 2004) . Therefore, if allowed, the landscape, the cityscape, can speak, not as we define it but, recalling Spinoza's notion of the perfection of things being defined within themselves, as it defines itself. Though using the term`speak' here is anthropocentric and symptomatic of our limited languages, (8) it is necessary as it is calling on human understanding to gain insight, however abstract or vague, to know the landscape's (8) My use of`speak' here is fundamentally different from Spinoza's when he states``for those who do know the true causes of things confuse everything and without any conflict of mind feign that both trees and men speak'' (Ethics, I, proposition 8, scholia 2). internalöas opposed to imposedöcondition. This understanding allows me to then ask the questions: What of the material place in which I live and dwell? Is it not also alive? Does it not also have spirit with its own affects, maybe similar to or perhaps completely different from my (and our) own, in its own internal complexity?
This discussion of complexity leads to another conundrum: namely, what exactly is complexity? What constitutes it? What is included (or not included) in considerations of its characteristics? Using a purely positivist (ie conventionally observational) approach disallows the worth and relevance of both the internal complexity of thought and affect and the external unknowns that lie beyond the observable, of which we may have merely a vague sense, if lucky. If we exist as a complex part(s) of a more complex whole as beings of becomings, of extension, of relation, and of interconnection, what of the objects and space(s) that we are extending to and from? What about landscapes? What about the cities themselves? Do not they also, endowed with their own nebulous spirits, have an existence and a worth at least equal to ours? Are they not each just a difference, without being less or more, weighed or measured, with their own affects? According to Thrift,`C ities may be seen as boiling maelstroms of affect. Particular affects such as anger, fear, happiness and joy are continually on the boil, rising here, subsiding there, and these affects continually manifest themselves in events which can take place either at a grand scale or simply as a part of continuing everyday life '' (2004, page 55) . As these affects are felt and embodied within the city, the landscapes which humans extend to and from are inseparable from them. Does not Mitchell's notion of landscape as``something that acts as a social agent in the further development of a place'' (Aitken and Dixon, 2006) or Ed Soja's`trialectical' theories of space (Soja, 1996) hint at as much? Indeed, if what is needed is an``awareness of the simultaneity and interwoven complexity of the social, historical, and the spatial, their inseparability and interdependence'' (page 3), are not humans just as dependent on and inseparable from the agency of the city and the landscape and their extending spaces as they are from us? Conversely, in their own complexity and power are they not also autonomous? This line of questioning then leads me to consider whether any sensed part is essentially just an arbitrary demarcation of the whole.
However, similar to the basic existential ruminations of GitS, I may argue that I sense an ego, an individual`I' which distinguishes me from others, while at the same time those others may also help constitute what a personal`I' is. So, even while connections and relations are recognized, a personal individualized ego still persists. Through Spinoza's monist yet heterogeneous ontology I find answers to these questions which reconcile perspectives through affect and the desiring, striving, and endeavoring that belongs to all finite thingsöthe conatus;`S pinoza's conatus is a rethinking of the idea of essence. It strips away the ancient association of essence with universals, allowing each individual to stand (not alone but on its own), not merely as an exemplar of a kind but as a unique particular, answering to various general descriptions, but bound in the end, by no nature of its own, as that nature expresses itself and interacts with the natures of other things'' (Goodman, 2002, page 39) . Thrift acknowledges that to speak of affect is almost invariably to speak of difference (2004, page 57) . In this sense, according to Deleuze, identity should be reread as a``second principle'',`a s a principle become; that it evolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical'' (1994, pages 40^41, emphasis in original).
To allow difference its own concept, then,must be to no longer hold an anthropocentric understanding of it. Further, to claim memory or affect as an outcome only of the human body or brain is to reduce the very concepts to nothing more than self-defeating dominations of the identical. As GitS demonstrates, animation in general (and anime in particular) provides geographers with a powerful vehicle to confront these dominations of the identical through their visual, thematic, and contextual challenges to, and reconfigurations of, stagnant and orthodox conceptions of identity and reality.
Through the messages of science fiction and the medium of filmic animation GitS asks that landscape be understood as more than merely a passive human production or mimetic canvas. The city, the town, the village, the countryside, the land untouchedöall must be understood as lives in their own right, their spirits sensed indirectly through our limited understanding, insufficient language and knowledge, with thought decentered and imagination askew towards affect. Indeed, only through imagination and affect can a connection to the landscape as a living and becoming thing be first indirectly channeled and touched. This is a lesson of Shinto. As Boyd and Nishimura explain,`t o experience the kami presence of any one of [the vital] aspects of nature requires an aesthetically pure and cheerful heart/mind (kokoro), an emotional, mental and volitional condition that is not easily attained ... . The reason for this is that although we are grounded in this pervasive vital process, we are too often unable to connect with it '' (2004) . With this in mind, Thrift's statement that``affect is understood as a form of thinking, often indirect and nonreflective, it is true, but thinking all the same. And, similarly, all manner of the spaces which [different approaches of affect] generate must be thought of in the same way, as means of thinking and as thought in action'' (2004, page 58, emphasis in original) must also extend to spaces and places as more than just human means, but as means of desire and action in themselves. Perhaps as the city/landscape is larger, more spread out through empirical space, so too is its ghost. It is a different body, a different mode, made up in a different complexity and intensity, and thus may be barely sensible to human understanding. A true gaining from filmic experiences and expressions of material realities and conditions of everyday lives therefore must expand to include difference in all its imaginable (and even unimaginable) forms. Indeed, life is such an unscientific term; it is a term culturally produced that changes in expansion and scope through space and time. Therefore, do not the lives of landscape, filmic or not, speak about more than just human myopic interests of mimetic meanings or productions, material or not? I believe I have demonstrated that this is so. And, although this all may seem like fantastical speculation, it is speculation that an acting landscape allows me to enter intoöand a speculation which the acting cityscape of GitS begs us to explore. Spinoza's ontology offers geographers a powerful mode of encounter with landscape, built through the body and its affects. By encountering landscape in this way, problematic dualisms and the separations they promote are subsumed and opened up to new levels of relation and correspondence. In understanding humans and the earth as relational modes of the same substance and all human activity as contemporaneous thought and extension, spatial phenomena necessarily impact and are impacted by human action and development which, in parallel, have corresponding actions in thought. Landscape can therefore be understood simultaneously as a metaphor, text, production, function, work, and doing work. But, beyond these more traditional understandings of landscape as mere human (re)presentation(s) or production(s), landscape must also be understood as an active relational force and striving in and for itself. Within this mode of encounter human perspectives can no longer dominate, but must be decentered and subsumed into greater relations in order to gain a fuller understanding of what landscape is and does. At this point, the question has surely arisen: what exactly is landscape and what does it do? To this I respond in the only way I can: landscape is what it does. It strives and endeavors, it pushes and pulls, it acts and reacts, it affects and is affected. It is a relational force pushing human interaction, production, and development as human interaction, production, and development push it. As I have tried to show, the way to understand this is firstly through the richness of the imagination and affect. Therefore, this paper is not an attempt to tell geographers how to feel about landscape, but to feel landscape, to sense its ghost or spirit (kami ), and understand that landscape is more than just a representation and production. Indeed, each interaction with landscape in its various forms will affect each person and their imagination differently from moment to moment and case by case. But to ignore the imagination and affect(s)öboth our own and those of landscapeöis to ignore fundamental aspects of how material landscape(s) function(s) and the power and force they have inside, outside, and (in) between human condition(s).
In an attempt to present a life of landscape, I turned to Shirow and Oshii's work of GitS because its combination of Shinto and Western philosophies, visual imagery, and similarities to Spinozan and Deleuzian thought was the means by which I was affectually pushed to consider landscape and the city as living and endeavoring things. By focusing on a character that in traditional contemporary society may be viewed as subhuman, or not human at all, Shirow and Oshii push the imagination to step beyond its usual boundaries, to the real and rational possibility that intelligence, life, affect, striving, ghost and spirit are a condition of all entities, all existences, no matter how small or large their differences from the human condition.
Here, in paraphrasing contrast to Silvio's (1999) observation of GitS's reinforcement of a conventional role of power, I postulate that the film, despite its criticisms of being too derivative of Blade Runner or the work of William Gibson (Yuen, 2000) , in fact does hold a grand uniqueness and lesson in its own right when it subverts accepted cultural conceptions in a deeper, more ingrained sense. By confronting traditionally held dichotomiesömind and body, part and whole, vibrant and static, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic/artificial, vital and inactive, idea and material öthe film frees the landscape, the cityscape, the environment, and ultimately the world from their perceived role as passive subjects as it calls for deeper understandings of the embodied affectual relations of the ghost in the city and a landscape of life.
Over a century ago, linguist and philosopher Edward Payson Evans acknowledged the need for a relational ethics inclusive of all things in the world and universe ö recognizing even the natural worth and mutual rights of rocks and minerals (Nash, 1989, pages 50^52) . By understanding potentialities as complex entities with their own spiritsömaybe analogous to human life and conditions or perhaps fundamentally differentöI believe that GitS similarly implores us to confront our very base ontological views of what life is and what is worthy of ethical consideration. Equally, we cannot only grant objects the qualities of complexity and vitality through our own self-referenced traditional logic and language or permit only`attractive' or`special' objects spiritual existence. This is to fall into the folly of the human habit of granting universal primacy to those objects which better serve senses, gazes, or affectsöit is to deny the very validity of difference. Further, by using aspects of Shinto ways of knowing and understanding, this paper makes the case that utilizing only orthodox Western systems of belief to understand landscape, film, and the city is often insufficient and lacking if the goal is to gain insight into either the cinematic works, the symbolism of landscapes, or the material realities which they impart and inform.
